9-1(c)(2).) Defendant then grabbed Rignall's head and shoved his penis into Rignall's mouth, shouting: "You love it, you love it," with a tone of voice used by a drill instructor. Defendant placed handcuffs on Piest, and then attempted to perform oral sex on him, but could not since Piest could not get an erection. Defendant used a rosary to demonstrate to Officer Bettiker and the other persons in the room at the time of the confession the "rope trick" that he used to strangle his victims. We disagree that any improper seizure concerning the television set occurred since the television set was not seized. The sentences were stayed (87 Ill.2d R. 609(a)) pending appeal to this court (Ill. Const. The People argue that the comment neither stated nor implied that all the defense psychiatrists would render an opinion as to whether defendant would meet the statutory requirements for legal insanity and that, in any event, it is unlikely that the jury would have even remembered this comment in opening statement after hearing a month of complex and conflicting psychiatric testimony. Because the "splitting off" process and projection of a repressed part is an unconscious process, Dr. Brocher opined, "My diagnosis proves the psychotic process because only persons who are psychotic can split off so far that they negate reality." We agree with the People that the sufficiency of the complaint does not rest on whether each segment is complete in itself but whether the complaint, considered as a whole, adequately establishes that there was "a fair probability that * * * evidence of a crime [would] be found in a particular place." In other instances cited by defendant, no error was committed because counsel was given the opportunity *32 to suggest additional questions concerning the potential jurors' opinions as to defendant's guilt and failed to do so, or the juror was excused for cause. Rignall testified that he was currently under psychiatric care and was also receiving treatments for his liver because the repeated use of chloroform had damaged his liver. Often he would come back up and eat dinner with the family, but if anyone said anything that displeased him, he would *52 lunge across the table at them. Defendant told Finder that he usually killed his victims for one of two reasons: because the victim demanded more money than originally agreed upon or because they posed a threat to him by exposing his sexual preferences to his neighbors. Dr. Ney explained that the second factor to be analyzed in determining the impact of media coverage is the emotional impact created by certain types of articles. Defendant also contends that his first confession was not the product of a rational mind or a free will, and that his second confession and all statements subsequently made were the product of "ineffective advice" from his attorney to confess. Defendant has cited no instance of failure to excuse for cause a prospective juror with a preconceived opinion but contends that the circuit court did not question the prospective jurors sufficiently to discover such opinions. March 21, 1978 (aged 15) Norwood Park Township, Illinois, United States. The two men tried to get the charges bumped up but Wilder claims that the states attorney dismissed them, using homophobic profanity. Defendant contends next that the People improperly insinuated that defense counsel and defendant had concocted the insanity defense the night before defendant's arrest. The jury was informed that Dr. Cavanaugh's and Dr. Fawcett's reports referred to alcohol and drug abuse. The night before defendant's sister was to marry, defendant and his father got into an argument over whether or not defendant would take a bath that night. Two psychologists and two psychiatrists testified on behalf of defendant. 2d 637, 89 S. Ct. 584, "that only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause, Beck v. Ohio [(1964), 379 U.S. 89, 96, 13 L. Ed. Nothing in the record supports defendant's contention that trial counsel encouraged him to confess, but even if defendant's attorneys had done so the night before he was arrested, such a decision on their part could easily be viewed as a legitimate defense tactic. Later, at a side bar, the court asked Dr. Rappaport if he had attempted to contact the news media in any way. We fail to see how defendant was prejudiced by his absence from this portion of the proceedings. (People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 327, 355.) In People v. Jones (1982), 94 Ill. 2d 275, the jury was informed that the defendant had been involved in numerous murders and had assaulted a couple living in East St. Louis, slashed the woman's throat, bludgeoned her face and head, cut deep gashes in her hands and arms, decapitated her husband, and carried the head of the husband and later discarded it. In Hester, a defense psychiatrist was precluded from giving his opinion "of the defendant's susceptibility to a dictated confession which would have been based on a complete case history given by [defendant] to the psychiatrist during their second interview." In Haywood and Jenkins, this court reversed the judgments because conflicting written instructions were given to the jury. Dr. Ney explained that in all these categories, there was "more of this type of emotionally impacting material" in Cook County than in any of the other outlying counties. Third, "human interest" stories focused on an individual's involvement in the case rather than the actual facts of the case. The defense called two other psychiatrists. Defendant argues that the murder of Timothy O'Rourke was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt and that this erroneous conviction necessitates a remand for a new sentencing hearing. He testified that "borderline" appeared for the first time in psychiatric nomenclature in Diagnostic Statistical Manual III (DSM III), that the diagnosis was quite controversial, and that "it is our single outstanding problem." Although no objections were made at trial to the admission of these confessions, defendant argues that the plain error rule should be invoked or, alternatively, that the failure to object is evidence of the incompetency of counsel. When O'Rourke's body was found in the Des Plaines River in Grundy County, it was naked and bloated. It was not improper for the circuit court to preclude the asking of the question which might require a variety of answers depending on how it was interpreted. However, he had confused thinking which "resembles to a large extent people who would be classified as schizophrenic * * *." He asked Donnelly "How's it feel knowing that you're going to die?" Despite this, defense counsel asked Dr. Cavanaugh whether defendant, if he were acquitted, could be civilly committed. Once inside the car, defendant placed a cloth soaked in chloroform over Rignall's face, causing him to lose consciousness. Simply stated, defendant's complaint concerning the questioning of the panel is that it was done "in such a way as to hide the jurors' biases rather than reveal them." Defendant asserts that there is no way of determining the stifling effect the judge's ruling had on the defense experts. Defendant complains that the questions concerning the death penalty, as they were reframed after the interrogation of the first 15 jurors, made it much less likely that a prospective juror would reveal that he strongly favored the imposition of the death penalty. Dr. Reifman stated that defendant could not be a pseudoneurotic paranoid schizophrenic because if he had such a defect he would have so many symptoms that he would be "an extremely impaired person" and would be "bothered in every area of his life." Number 1, he goes to his lawyer, it doesn't necessarily follow that the lawyer is suggesting he's going to a lawyer and he's coming up with this." Jeffrey eventually passed away in 2000 at 49 years old. Michel Ried testified that he was a homosexual and met defendant in "New Town." He expressed the opinion that defendant was suffering from pervasive narcissism, with an obsessive compulsive quality, an antisocial quality, and a hypomaniac quality, all of which were components of his mixed personality disorder. Second, defendant argues that the assistant State's Attorney improperly discredited Dr. Freedman's testimony by exaggerating the significance of DSM III and intentionally misrepresenting "the doctor's testimony regarding his diagnosis in relation to the manual." How Did. The gun contained a blank. 674, 678-79, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332-33.) Defendant carried Rignall into his house and offered him a drink. In 1979, Rignall wrote the book 29 Below about the experience. Defendant then punched Donnelly, and once again held his head in the bathtub until he passed out. When defendant *36 did ask that the remainder of the voir dire be closed to the public, he did so only on the bare assertion that prospective jurors were not being fully candid. It has been recognized that the effect of prejudicial or inflammatory evidence depends upon the circumstances of the case. Antonucci testified that defendant once came over to his house to show him stag films. Stat. In March 1977, Jeffrey Rignall accepted a ride and an offer of marijuana from John Wayne Gacy, only to be chloroformed as soon as he got into the vehicle. Defendant's first two arguments concerning this contention assumed the invalidity of the first warrant. Defendant contends next that the court should have determined that defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to a stipulated sentencing hearing. He described the murder of Robert Piest in some detail, and stated that after he had put the rope around Piest's neck he twisted it twice, but then the phone rang, so he went to answer the phone, and left Piest to die of suffocation. William Kunkle, retired Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County describes his story at the time as vague, saying Rignall didnt know where the house was or what it looked like, so it was a very minimalist police report and nothing transpired.. On cross-examination, it was brought out that after these intense expressions of hostility, defendant could justify his behavior as conforming to his private code of morality, even though he recognized that his behavior would not be considered socially acceptable. In their brief, amici curiae, 60 in number, argue that the death penalty is per se unconstitutional. As noted in Gregg, the determination of whether capital punishment is a deterrent to certain types of murders such as those enumerated in the Illinois death penalty statute is an issue the resolution of which properly rests with the General Assembly. Defense counsel insisted that the jury could draw an inference from the prosecutor's question that Dr. Rappaport had violated the court's order forbidding attorneys, experts and other parties from talking to the press about the case. She was of the opinion that defendant was not legally responsible for his actions under the Illinois standard, and that defendant would have killed his victims even if a police officer had been present at the time of the murder. I agree that the convictions of murder should be affirmed in this case. Defendant explained that he would frequently stuff socks into the mouths of victims to prevent the blood coming through the mouth *50 after death from staining the floor. Defendant jumped out of the car in which they were riding and walked to their house, which was about a block away, and when she arrived home, defendant acted as if nothing had happened. We find here no reason to invoke the plain error doctrine. 2d 248, 255, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2618; Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (1980), 448 U.S. 555, 558-81, 65 L. Ed. Dr. Rappaport testified that he administered sodium amytal to defendant to induce a deep hypnotic condition. Defendant alleges that if a different jury had been impaneled its attention would have been focused solely on aggravation and mitigation without the distraction of the insanity determination. Jeffrey claimed that he was bound to a wooden board with holes for his head and arms. Defendant has also contended that the sentence discretion vested in the prosecution by the death penalty statute is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative and judicial authority. . Under this theory, information which is associated with a strong emotional response is much more easily remembered than information which does not evoke a particular emotional response. Stat. ", The circuit court's first application of its ruling that defendant's experts could not testify to "self-serving" statements made by defendant occurred during the testimony of Dr. Eliseo. *61 Robert Donnelly testified that he was walking in Chicago when defendant approached him in his black car (which had spotlights on both sides) and asked for identification. I will be good." We find no error in the circuit court's refusal to allow funds for this expenditure. Defendant then drove off. On cross-examination, he stated that he used the psychoanalytic approach in examining patients and that there are a significant number of psychiatrists who neither use nor place reliance in this approach. Defendant contends that the court's questioning was inadequate because it did not sufficiently explore the prospective jurors' exposure to news accounts of the case.
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